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Fulton Sheen once said, “Whenever I have a new idea, I read the ancients to see how 
they put it.” In his article “History of Treatment of Conjoined Twins,” Krzysztof 
Kobylarz explores the causes and kinds of conjoined twins as understood by think-
ers like Democritus, Empedocles, and Aristotle all the way through to writers in the 
late twentieth century.1 The article contains twenty-six drawings and photographs of 
conjoined twins united at the head, at the chest, at the rump, and in virtually every 
other combination imaginable. Kobylarz notes the ancient dehumanizing habit of 
describing such people as “monsters.” Unfortunately, he perpetuates this dehuman-
izing tradition by speaking of one conjoined twin who was dependent on a sibling as 
“a parasite foetus.” “Despite the doctors’ efforts,” writes Kobylarz, “the child died 
shortly after separation from the parasite.” 2 
It is hard to imagine words more likely to contribute to dehumanization than 
speaking of an innocent human being as a “parasite fetus.” As John Finnis said at 
“Open Hearts, Open Minds, and Fair-Minded Words: A Conference on Life and 
Choice in the Abortion Debate” held at Princeton University,
About the moral status of the phrase “the fetus,” I will just say this. As used 
in . . . [non-medical] contexts, it is offensive, dehumanizing, prejudicial, 
manipulative. Used in this [non-medical] context, exclusively and in prefer-
ence to the alternatives, it is an F-word, to go with the J-word, and other such 
words we know of, which have or had an acceptable meaning in a proper 
context but became in wider use the symbol of subjection to the prejudices and 
preferences of the more powerful. It’s not a fair word, and it does not suggest 
an open heart. Those of you who have an open mind or a fair heart may wish 
to listen to every speaker at this conference, and see whether they are willing 
1 Krzysztof Kobylarz, “History of Treatment of Conjoined Twins,” Anaesthesiology 
Intensive Therapy 46.2 (April 2014): 116–122.
2 Ibid., 122.
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to speak, at least sometimes, of the unborn child or unborn baby, and to do so 
without scare quotes or irony.3
It is wrong, theoretically wrong and practically wrong, to use language to 
dehumanize human beings. It is theoretically wrong because it is untruthful, and it is 
practically wrong because it contributes to rationalizations for treating human beings 
as less than human. So let us not speak of conjoined twins as “fetuses,” or “parasites,” 
or “monsters,” for such ways of speaking may lead us and others to begin to forget that 
people are equal in basic dignity. Although some people have denied this basic equality 
to human conjoined twins, my remarks here will presuppose that all human beings, 
conjoined or not conjoined, are created equal and endowed with inalienable rights. 
Although they were not innocent of using the language of “monster” for 
conjoined twins, ecclesiastical writers both in theory and in practice recognized 
the humanity of human beings with fused bodies. In his article “Conjoined Twins, 
Medieval Biology, and Evolving Reflection on Individual Identity,” Irven Resnick 
explores the fascinating way in which medieval scholastics dealt with the topic of 
conjoined twins.4 Much of the discussion arose from this passage from St. Augustine’s 
De civitate Dei: “Some years ago, quite within my own memory, a man was born in 
the East, doubled in his upper members, but single in his lower ones. For he had two 
heads, two chests, four hands, but one belly and two feet like one man; and he lived 
so long that rumor [of him] drew many people to see him.” 5 Much of the debate in 
the Middle Ages was about the causes leading to conjoined twins, a topic explored 
by Albert the Great. Often spurred by questions posed at quodlibetal sessions in the 
universities, Resnick chronicles how medieval scholastics also sought to understand 
how the sacraments applied to conjoined twins. 
Concerning Baptism, the consensus view seemed to have been that if there are 
two heads and two hearts, then there are two souls, and hence need for two Baptisms. 
However, other additional body parts, such as additional fingers or toes, were not 
viewed as constituting additional people. But questions remained. Part of the medieval 
dispute centered on whether the head or the heart was the principle organ of the body 
sufficient for identifying an individual person. Henry of Ghent argued that if there 
are two heads but only one heart, then just one Baptism was required because the 
second head was just an appendage of one human body.6 On the other hand, if there 
are two hearts, then Henry concluded, “it is necessary to assert that such a monster 
has two rational souls, with the result that they are truly two persons and two human 
3 John Finnis, “The Other F-Word,” Public Discourse, October 20, 2010, http://www 
.thepublicdiscourse.com/2010/10/1849/.
4 Irven Resnick, “Conjoined Twins, Medieval Biology, and Evolving Reflection on 
Individual Identity,” Viator 44.2 (May 2013): 343–368.
5 Augustine, De civitate Dei, ed. Bernhard Dombart and Alfons Kalb, Corpus Christia-
norum Series Latina vol. 48 (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 1955), 16.8.53–56: “Ante annos 
aliquot, nostra certe memoria, in oriente duplex homo natus est superioribus membris, infe-
rioribus simplex. nam duo erant capita, duo pectora, quattuor manus, uenter autem unus, et 
pedes duo, sicut uni homini; et tamdiu uixit, ut multos ad eum uidendum fama contraheret.”
6 Resnick, “Conjoined Twins,” 362.
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beings.” 7 Other scholastics argued that two heads were enough, even with a single 
shared heart, to constitute two persons. For example, the English Franciscan and 
Archbishop of Canterbury John Peckham argued that each head should be baptized, 
and if there was some question, after the first Baptism, the other Baptism could be 
conditionally made: “If you are not already baptized, I baptize you in the name of the 
Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.” The view that eventually prevailed in 
the Catholic tradition was that there should be as many Baptisms as there are heads.8
May conjoined twins enter into the sacrament of Matrimony? At least in cases 
of conjoined twins with two heads capable of giving consent but with only one body 
below the head, Parisian master Eustache de Grandcourt—who was active at the Uni-
versity of Paris around 1303—saw a serious difficulty. He felt that for such persons 
marriage was impossible. A wife may only be sexually intimate with her husband, 
but in the case of conjoined male twins, she would be intimate with not only the one 
twin she consented to marry but also with the other twin in virtue of the twins shar-
ing “only one instrument of generation.” So in consummating the marriage, she and 
her brother-in-law would be committing adultery. On the other hand, if she attempts 
to consent to marry both twins, this too would be impossible, for monogamy rather 
than bigamy is the Christian form of marriage. 
Despite raising this objection, Eustache concluded that conjoined persons may 
indeed get married because they have been given everything necessary for marriage. 
They can give consent, and they can consummate the marriage. Nature does not act in 
vain. Resnick does not indicate how Eustache resolved the adultery dilemma he had 
earlier posed.
Let us consider one possible solution to the dilemma. Consider Chad and Peter, 
conjoined twins having two heads but having just one body below the head. Chad 
wants to marry Laura, Laura wants to marry Chad, and both are otherwise eligible to 
marry. Christian marriage excludes bigamy, so Chad and Peter cannot both consent 
to marry Laura, and Laura may only consent to marry either Chad or Peter. Chad 
and Laura exchange marriage vows, so far, so good. However, in consummating the 
marriage, are Laura and her brother-in-law Peter committing adultery? At least on 
some accounts of intention (more on this later), Laura and Peter are not necessarily 
intending to join themselves together in a sexual way. The sexual union of Peter and 
Laura is a foreseen side effect rather than something either one necessarily chooses. 
Since the consummation of their marriage need not involve adultery, conjoined twins 
with two heads but only one body may enter into marriage.
Contemporary discussions of conjoined twins have focused not so much on 
questions of sacramental validity (these seemingly having been settled), but on the 
ethics of separating conjoined twins. A sound answer to the question of separation 
depends on both relevant biological details and on philosophical considerations. As 
7 Ibid., 363.
8 This medieval debate finds an analog in contemporary discussions of human identity 
and individuality. For example, Eric Olson examines questions such as whether conjoined 
twins are two organisms but only one person. See, Eric Olson, “The Metaphysical Implica-
tions of Conjoined Twinning,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 52.S1 (August 2014): 24–40.
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a matter of biology, conjoined twins are found in a wide variety of conditions and 
are often classified based on their point of union.9 For example, thoracopagus twins 
are joined at the chest, omphalopagus twins are joined at the abdomen, and crani-
opagus twins are joined at the head. Another classification is as symmetrical (both 
twins well developed) or asymmetrical (one twin well-formed and the other not). In 
heteropagus twinning, one twin is dependent for life on the other twin. One can also 
imagine a case in which both twins are dependent on each other, for instance, one 
has a functioning heart and the other has a functioning liver. 
The point of joining does not seem morally significant: for example, in cases 
of twins joined at the head, they might be superficially joined and thereby easily 
separated, restoring natural bodily integrity to both and endangering the life and 
well-being of neither. On the other hand, some instances of twins joined at the rump 
might be so profoundly fused that to separate them risks or even necessarily brings 
about the death of one or both. 
In the most ethically difficult cases, separating conjoined twins may be medi-
cally necessary to save one twin but will certainly kill the other twin. Such was the 
case of Jodie and Mary. The heart and lungs most closely associated with Mary’s 
body could not circulate blood for her, so oxygenated blood came by way of Jodie’s 
heart and lungs. Physicians foresaw that Jodie’s lungs and heart were incapable of 
sustaining long-term support for both girls. The choice facing the physicians, parents, 
and courts was whether or not to separate the girls. If the girls were not separated, 
they would both die. If they were separated, Jodie would likely survive, but Mary 
would surely die. Is separating them intentional killing? Is unjoining them intentional 
mutilation? Is there an obligation to separate them? 10
The answer to such questions depends in part on the account of intention adopted. 
In contemporary discussion of natural law ethics, two accounts of intention have 
emerged, what might be called the narrow view and what might be called the broad 
view. Advocates of the new natural law theory, such as Germain Grisez, John Finnis, 
and Joseph Boyle, argue for the narrow account of intention in which only those effects 
which are chosen as a means or as an end in the proposed plan of an agent count as 
intended. All other effects are foreseen. So the man who goes jogging does not intend 
to perspire or to wear out his running shoes. One could, of course, imagine some odd 
case in which the goal of the jogging was wearing out the shoes, since say, he knows 
a much better pair of shoes is coming his way as soon as this pair is worn out. But 
normally, wearing out running shoes is not part of what is intended either as a means 
or as an end. Wearing out running shoes is praeter intentionem. Advocates of what 
might be called classic natural law theory, such as Stephen Brock, Rev. Lawrence 
Dewan, OP, and Rev. Kevin Flannery, SJ, argue that intention cannot be limited to 
only such chosen effects precisely as a means or as an end, but must include other 
 9 Michelle Lee, Arun K. Gosain, and Devra Becker, “The Bioethics of Separating 
Conjoined Twins in Plastic Surgery,” Plastic Reconstructive Surgery 128 (October 2011): 
328e–334e. 
10 I have attempted to answer these questions elsewhere: “The Tragic Case of Jodie 
and Mary: Questions about Separating Conjoined Twins,” Linacre Quarterly 70.2 (May 
2003): 159–170.
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effects as well.11 The broad view holds that other effects must be included in the 
agent’s intention, for example, those effects that are closely related, or foreseen with 
certainty, or part of the act as a reasonable person would understand the act, and so 
forth. Although they may disagree about what effects should be included as intended 
and on what grounds, the critics agree in rejecting the narrow view.
Classic natural law advocates Matthew O’Brien and Robert Koons offer a 
detailed contribution to this discussion in their article “Objects of Intention: A 
Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory.” 12 New natural law defender 
Christopher Tollefsen has supplied a spirited rejoinder to O’Brien and Koons.13
One thing on which O’Brien, Koons, and Tollefsen all agree is that counter-
factual criteria for determining intention do not work. O’Brien and Koons ask us to 
imagine that “artificial wombs and restorative operations became available to recon-
stitute and bring to term the dismembered fetus; if the mother and surgeon would 
take advantage of them were they available, then in the actual world where they are 
unavailable, the mother and surgeon need not intend the child’s death by chopping 
it to pieces.” 14 This way of distinguishing intention from foresight surely fails. After 
all, in garden variety murder in order to cover a theft, the killer could truthfully say 
to his gagged and bound victim, “If there were any other way I could secure your 
silence about my theft, if only there were a pill you could take to erase your memory 
of this whole event, I would certainly spare your life. But since no such pill exists, I 
have to kill you to make sure that you don’t reveal my identity.” He then shoots her 
in the head, twice. If this is not intention killing, then nothing is.
Aside from this agreement, much separates the broad and the narrow views of 
intention, including the proper interpretation of Aquinas, whether the new natural 
law theory is Cartesian in its account of intention, and whether the broad view or 
narrow view best accounts for our intuitions about various concrete cases such as, 
for example, craniotomy or the use of methotrexate to treat ectopic pregnancies. A 
full consideration of the arguments for and against the narrow view of intention falls 
outside the scope of this essay.15 It will be enough to consider how these two views 
would approach the case of conjoined twins such as Jodie and Mary.
11 See, for example, the following articles that appeared in the Winter 2008 issue of Nova 
et Vetera: Stephen Brock, “Veritatis Splendor §78, St. Thomas, and (Not Merely) Physical 
Objects of Moral Acts,” 1–62; Laurence Dewan, “St. Thomas, Rhonheimer, and the Object 
of the Moral Act,” 63–112; Kevin L. Flannery, “Aristotle and Human Movements,” 113–38; 
and Stephen Long, “Veritatis splendor §78 and the Teleological Language of the Moral Act,” 
139–56; see also Steven J. Jensen, Good and Evil Actions: A Journey through Saint Thomas 
Aquinas (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2010).
12 Matthew B. O’Brien and Robert C. Koons, “Objects of Intention: A Hylomorphic 
Critique of the New Natural Law Theory,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86.4 
(Fall 2012): 655–703.
13 Christopher Tollefsen, “Response to Robert Koons and Matthew O’Brien’s ‘Objects 
of Intention: A Hylomorphic Critique of the New Natural Law Theory,’” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly 87.4 (Fall 2013): 751–778.
14 O’Brien and Koons, “Objects of Intention,” 656.
15 My own views may be found in Christopher Kaczor, “Distinguishing Intention from 
Foresight: What Is Included in a Means to an End?,” International Philosophical Quarterly 
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On the narrow view of intention, the separation of Jodie and Mary is not a 
case of intentional killing, since physicians separating the twins are not seeking the 
death of Mary as a means or as an end of their procedure. Yes, the death of Mary will 
result from the procedure, but, like the prenatal death that occurs in the removal of 
a gravid cancerous uterus, this death is not intended as a means or as an end. In the 
case of Mary and in the case of a removal of a cancerous uterus early in pregnancy, 
the death of the human being is a foreseen side effect—praeter intentionem, to use 
Aquinas’s phrase—of a morally legitimate action. 
On the broad account of intention, as understood by O’Brien and Koons, the 
separation of Jodie and Mary might seem to be intentional killing. The doctors in this 
case knew with full certainty that separation from Jodie would inevitably cause the 
death of Mary. However, if the separation were understood as akin to the removal of 
a tubal pregnancy, the broad account of intention might still be able to account for 
Mary’s death as a side effect. About ectopic pregnancy, O’Brien and Koons write, 
In removing the tube the surgeon is not depriving the embryo of a condi-
tion that is sufficient for its survival, nor of a condition that is natural for the 
embryo at that point in its development, and the embryo doesn’t have a claim 
on its mother to extend momentarily its unnatural growth at the cost of her 
death. By removing the fallopian tube, the surgeon is removing an unnatural 
delayer of the child’s death: he is not thereby causing, or even hastening her 
death, which is due to the absence of the supply of oxygen and nutrients from 
a placenta properly implanted in the womb. Removing the tube and removing 
the cancerous uterus are similar because both are targeted remedies of defec-
tive biological functioning.16 
Similar reasoning could be used to justify the separation of Jodie and Mary. The 
conjunction of Jodie and Mary is an unnatural union. In separating Jodie and Mary, 
the surgeons are not depriving Mary of a condition that is sufficient for her survival, 
nor of a condition that is natural for her in terms of human functioning, and she 
doesn’t have a claim on Jodie to extend indefinitely her unnatural union with Jodie 
at the cost of Jodie’s death. By separating Mary and Jodie, the surgeon is removing 
an unnatural delayer of Mary’s death. The surgeon is not thereby causing, or even 
hastening Mary’s death, which is due to the absence of sufficient oxygenated blood 
from her own malfunctioning heart. Separating Jodie and Mary and removing the 
ectopic pregnancy in a fallopian tube are similar because both are targeted remedies 
of defective biological functioning in Jodie and in the mother respectively. If this 
analysis is correct, the separation of Jodie and Mary would not be a case of intentional 
killing, but a case of letting die, even on a broad account of intention.17
chrisTopher KAczor
41.1 (March 2001): 77–89; and Christopher Kaczor, “Intention, Foresight, and Mutilation: A 
Response to Giebel,” International Philosophical Quarterly 47.4 (December 2007): 481–486.
16 O’Brien and Koons, “Objects of Intention,” 687–688.
17 I am grateful to the James Madison Program at Princeton University for the support 
provided in writing this essay.
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